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The securitization expansion preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis introduced 
alternative liquidity sources and increased bank lending capacity. During the 
securitization expansion there was a rise and subsequent collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market. We investigate the impact of securitization and the subprime 
mortgage collapse on bank lending during the crisis. The results suggest that 
securitization, for the large and money-center bank, is a cost effective liquidity source 
since traditional bank funding costs play a diminished role in the supply of bank 
lending. We find that for the small and medium bank samples increases in REPO 
rates fostered lending during the crisis period. We show that real estate lending 
exposure negatively affects bank lending in the sample of small and medium banks 
suggesting a liquidity building behavior for these banks. 
  
JEL classification: E44; G21 




The origin of the securitization markets 1  dates to the 1970s with the U.S. 
economy witnessing explosive growth in this market since its inception until the 
advent of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Funds flow account data underscores the 
significant growth in U.S. securitized home mortgages, which increased from U.S. 
$27.7 billion as of 1976Q1, a starting period for the home mortgage securitization 
market, to U.S. $6.4 trillion as of 2007Q4. This represents an average annual growth 
rate of 18.7% over a time-span of almost thirty-two years. The securitization 
phenomenon has transformed the way in which financial intermediation takes place. 
In recent years, the banking model has changed in that banks originate loans that are 
pooled, tranched, and eventually resold through the securitization process. Under 
the new banking model, large investors that supply bank funds (e.g. mutual funds, 
                                                     
1  Securitization is a process of creating and issuing new financial instruments such as debt securities 
or bonds whose payments of principal and interest derive from cash flows generated by a separate 
pool of assets. Typically, the pool of assets that are initially owned by commercial banks are 
transferred to a separate legal entity known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV). 
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sovereign wealth funds, large cash-rich companies) receive collateral to protect their 
investments since insured banks cannot offer government-backed deposit insurance 
to these investors2.   
The stage was set prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis with historically low 
interest rates and lax credit markets. This was reminiscent of the first national bubble 
in U.S. home prices, during the Great Depression of the 1930s. By mid-2007 the 
correction in the housing market led banks to report substantial losses and to take 
significant write downs of their real estate mortgage portfolios as a result of rising 
delinquencies and home-value reductions. The rising loan delinquencies are 
arguably a consequence of an increase in non-traditional lending characterized by 
loose requirements on borrowers’ income verification to support mortgage 
repayment ability and minimal down payment requirements.  Some claim that the 
real estate mortgage-backed securities market fueled the housing bubble, providing 
increased financing of these high-risk non-traditional loans through the 
securitization process.  Others conclude that the housing, securitization, and repo 
markets were at the nexus of the financial crisis. 
Surprisingly, scant literature investigates the impact of securitization on bank 
lending.  Altunbas et al. (2009) draws from a large data set of euro-area banks from 
12 countries during 1999-2005, examining the impact of securitization on the 
effectiveness of the bank lending channel (BLC) and the banks’ ability to grant loans. 
They conclude that securitization shelters banks’ loan supply from the effects of 
monetary policy and strengthen banks’ capacity to supply new loans; however, this 
capacity is conditioned on business cycle conditions and banks’ risk positions. Using 
a data set of U.S. banks and a sample period from 1976Q1 to 2007Q4, Loutskina (2011) 
introduces a novel bank-level index that estimates bank loan portfolio liquidity to 
examine the impact of securitization on bank liquidity and lending management. She 
finds that securitization allows banks to reduce holdings of liquid securities which 
increases lending ability. Furthermore, securitization offers banks an additional 
funding source making bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. Neither 
of these papers, however, capture the cost of securitization in modeling loan behavior. 
The above papers imply that the effectiveness of securitization as an alternative 
funding source for banks hinges on the strength (and liquidity) of the securitization 
market. While it is well known that the housing bubble and subsequent burst was at 
the heart of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Loutskina (2011) specification does not 
control for this important variable. Further, the study ends at the early stages of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis, and thus the results may not reflect the full impact of the 
financial crisis. 
                                                     
2 In practice this form of collateralized transaction between an investor and the bank is commonly 
referred to as a repurchase (REPO) agreement. The investor purchases some asset from the bank (i.e. 
the collateral) at an agreed upon price with the understanding that the bank will repurchase the same 
asset sometime in the future at a higher pre-established price with the difference representing the 
investment gains.  
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This paper expands the literature by investigating the impact of securitization 
and the subprime mortgage collapse on bank lending in the midst of the 2007-2009 
financial crisis employing methodologies from the (BLC) literature. Examining the 
effect of securitization on bank lending is interesting since active securitization 
markets represent an important alternative liquidity source that enhances lending 
capacity as suggested by Loutskina (2011). Researchers including Cornett et al. (2011), 
however, suggest that in times of crisis, banks tend to build up liquidity reserves, 
which could infringe on lending, as part of an overall strategy to manage liquidity 
risk including risk due to a loss of short term financing. An understanding of how 
the subprime mortgage market collapse affects bank lending is important for policy 
makers, bank regulators, and investors. Loose monetary policy, cheap money, and 
aggressive lending contributed to both the boom and subsequent bust of the housing 
market and the fall of the subprime mortgage market.  A deeper understanding of 
commercial bank behavior, including its lending activities, is driven by their role in 
stimulating business and economic activity. In times of financial crises, losses tend to 
spread across financial institutions thus jeopardizing the well-being of the financial 
system with negative repercussions for the economy and the business community as 
a whole. 
We contribute to the literature in several distinct ways. First, we re-examine 
empirical models of lending behavior given the securitization phenomena that 
transformed the bank intermediation process. Our empirical lending models, unlike 
previous studies, incorporate a REPO spread variable backed by securitized bonds 
(where the collateral consists mainly of real estate mortgage-backed securities) to 
assess whether these new channels of bank liquidity represent a sustainable 
alternative to more traditional sources of bank funding.  The work of Gorton and 
Metrick (2012) implies that traditional bank run on deposits that disrupted the 
banking system dating back to the days of the banking panic of the early 1930s  have 
been replaced by a run in the REPO markets. Regressing various credit spreads and 
REPO spreads on a series of control variables including the LIBOR-OIS spread, a 
measure of counter-party risk which was statistically significant, the authors 
conclude higher bank solvency uncertainty and lower values of REPO collateral.  
Second, in contrast to previous studies the sample period from 2005Q1 to 2010Q4 
covers economic expansion (including the peak period of the housing bubble), the 
subsequent bust of the recent U.S. financial crisis, and the following mild recovery. 
The sample period also covers an important transition the financial industry 
experienced that deals with a changing banking model that eventually led to new 
forms of bank runs. Third limited attention has focused on how the subprime 
mortgage market collapse impacted bank lending. Drawing from rich empirical work 
on the BLC and employing individual bank-level data and macroeconomic variables, 
we assess the presence of a BLC incorporating a bank liquidity shock caused by the 
subprime mortgage market crisis. The subprime mortgage crisis arguably generated 
an exogenous liquidity supply shock that is uncorrelated with firm loan demand.  
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We apply dynamic panel data methods to a sample of banks following a four-
size classification scheme based on asset size that yields 4,982 small banks, 475 
medium banks, 34 large banks, and 14 money-center banks to examine commercial 
lending behavior over a sample period 2005Q1 to 2010Q4. We show that traditional 
bank funding costs play a diminished role in the supply of bank lending in the larger 
bank samples (large banks and money-center banks) and a positive impact of the 
repurchase agreement (REPO) market rates on bank lending is prevalent in the 
smaller bank samples (small and medium banks), suggesting increases in REPO rates 
foster lending during the crisis period. We also find real estate lending exposure 
negatively affects bank lending in the small and medium bank samples.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
literature review focusing on bank lending behavior during the crisis, and Section 3 
describes the data and sources and presents descriptive statistics. Our methodology 
and empirical model is presented in Section 4 and Section 5 puts forth our hypotheses. 
Section 6 discusses the results, and we present the conclusions in Section 7. 
2. Literature Review 
Recent literature that examines the securitization market is motivated by its 
explosive growth, the banks’ increased dependency on the financial markets as a 
source of funding, and the impact that this market had on the U.S. banking system 
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  An important implication of the 
securitization process as suggested by Altunbas et al.(2009) is that while bank-
financed projects may be illiquid, the underlying loan, if eligible, may be sold which 
in turn provides the originating bank with a new source of financing. Researchers 
including Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (2010), 
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) and Korinek (2011) provide the theoretical 
framework tied to the new securitization-based banking model with emphasis on 
the measurement of systemic risk and stress testing. Collectively, these studies 
propose a bidirectional relationship between asset-market liquidity and traders-
funding liquidity. They also introduce the phenomena of amplification effects 
through various channels including the REPO markets and posit a positive 
relationship between securitization and banks’ real investments, concluding that 
financial markets are pro-cyclical. The implication of amplification effects as posited 
by theory provides further support for the modeling specifications presented in our 
research.  
Cecchetti (2009) claims that the triggering event of the financial crisis took place 
in August 2007 when the large French bank BNP Paribas suspended redemptions 
from three of its investment funds since it could not reliably value the assets backed 
by U.S. subprime mortgage debt held in those funds. Gorton and Metrick (2012) 
define the subprime mortgage market as a financial innovation created to provide 
housing finance to disproportionately poor and minority individuals with some 
combination of spotty credit histories, a lack of income verification or no money for 
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a down payment. The symptom of this crisis is also captured through the 3 month 
LIBOR-OIS spread, which is a common proxy in the literature for counterparty risk 
(refer to Figure I). We argue that this event introduced a liquidity shock to the banks 
that was unrelated to business fundamentals while highly related to problems 
arising from housing mortgages. 
 
Figure I LIBOR-Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Spread 
 
Source: The 90 day London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) series US0003M and the 
Overnight Index Swap (OIS) series USSOC Curncy are expressed in daily frequency and 
downloaded from the Bloomberg database http://www.bloomberg.com. The spread 
was computed by subtracting the OIS series from the LIBOR series. The author 
computes a quarterly average LIBOR-OIS spread series from the daily data. The 
quarterly series is used for model purposes. The OIS rate is a commonly used measure 
of investor expectations of the effective federal funds rate. The LIBOR rate is expected 
to reflect credit risk and the expectations on future overnight federal funds rates. 
 
Figure II, which depicts the TED spread, provides a similar story to that of 
Figure I while also capturing the liquidity crunch that evolved during the crisis. 
Brunnermeier (2009) provides a comprehensive chronology of the 2007-2009 
financial crisis and introduces the concept of “amplification effects” in connection 
with the housing bust through various channels. He points out that prior to the 2007-
2009 financial crisis, banks were heavily exposed to maturity mismatch through 
liquidity backstop credit facilities granted to their off-balance sheet vehicles and 





























































































































60                           Banking and Finance Review                      2 • 2015 
funding liquidity and investors’ reluctance to purchase mortgage/asset-backed 
paper placed enormous pressure on the financial system. Using large syndicated 
loan data to examine the impact of the financial crisis on bank lending, Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2010) point out that the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market in 
turn raised concerns about the solvency and liquidity of financial institutions. This 
unfolded into a full-scale banking panic linked to short-term creditors  and bank 
corporate borrowers following the failures of Lehman Brothers’ and Washington 
Mutual, the government takeovers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and government 
intervention in AIG during the latter part of 2008Q3. 
 
Figure II TED Spread
 
Source: The 90 day London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) series USD3MTD156 N and the 
90 day U.S. Treasury Bill series DTB3 are expressed in daily frequency and downloaded 
from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database available through the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ The TED spread was 
computed by subtracting the U.S. Treasury Bill series from the LIBOR series. The author 
computes a quarterly average TED spread series from the daily data. The quarterly series is 
used for model purposes. The TED spread is viewed as an indicator of perceived credit risk 
in the economy. 
 
The focus of our research bears resemblance to the studies by Khwaja and Mian 
(2008), Paravisini (2008), Cornett et al. (2011) and Egly and Mollick (2013). These 
authors exploit significant events to determine whether liquidity shocks related to 
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on the economy, Khwaja and Mian (2008) apply a fixed-effects methodology to loan-
level panel data from 1996-2000 on corporate lending in Pakistan. They find a 
significant bank-lending channel for all borrowing firms and that larger firms borrow 
from other unaffected banks, thus are able to attenuate the impact of a supply-side 
liquidity shock. Examining government allotments granted over the 1993-1999 time-
frame to banks in Argentina, Paravisini (2008) finds that banks expand lending in 
response to the added dollars of external financing. Based on a sample of 111 banks 
that received the government allotments and loan data for over 220,000 firms and 
individuals, he also concludes that financial constraints prevent banks from 
undertaking profitable lending opportunities and that these opportunities are not 
arbitraged by other competing lenders. 
Drawing from the population of insured commercial banks in the U.S. between 
2006Q1 and 2009Q2, Cornett et al. (2011) find that banks that relied heavily on core 
deposits and equity capital continued to lend during the financial crisis relative to 
other banks while banks that held higher levels of illiquid assets chose to increase 
asset liquidity and reduce lending. They also find that off-balance sheet liquidity risk 
materialized onto the banks’ balance sheets and curbed new lending since increased 
takedown demand displaced lending capacity. Egly and Mollick (2013) apply 
dynamic panel data methods to a subsample of 100 banks that are CPP recipients 
over a period from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4 and find a modest impact on lending by only 
the largest banks. They conclude that CPP’s business objectives to boost loan growth 
and stimulate business activity during the financial crisis are unmet. 
The modeling of bank-lending behavior would be incomplete if we ignored the 
credit channel of monetary policy transmission in our empirical framework. The 
existence of balance sheet and bank-lending channels that are encompassed within 
the credit channel are captured by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Mishkin (1995). 
The aforementioned authors claim that the balance-sheet channel (BSC) stresses the 
potential impact of changes in monetary policy on borrower’s balance sheets and 
income statements while the bank-lending channel (BLC) focuses more narrowly on 
the potential effect of monetary policy on the supply of bank loans. They assert that 
according to the credit-channel theory, the direct effects of monetary policy actions 
on interest rates are magnified by endogenous changes in the external finance 
premium, which is defined as the cost differential arising from funds raised 
externally (equity or debt issues) compared to internally-generated funds (i.e. 
retained earnings). The nature and focus of our paper leans towards a detection of a 
BLC as opposed to a BSC, since the latter would typically require a data set comprised 
of non-financial firms that is not compiled for purposes of this research. However, as 
pointed out by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) an increase in bank holdings of volatile 
securities and derivative instruments may have also increased the sensitivity of bank 
lending to interest rates via the BSC. Finally, our paper acknowledges that this 
research indirectly measures the impact of a credit channel on the economy through 
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our econometric methodology that allows for reverse causation effects from lending 
to economic output. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample draws from the population of commercial banks that are insured 
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) over the sample time 
frame 2005Q1 to 2010Q4.  The bank information used is originally documented in 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income “call reports” that are submitted by 
insured banks on a quarterly basis. The call reports that commercial banks file are 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) forms FFIEC-031 or 
FFIEC-041. The choice of the FFIEC form is dictated by the geographic scope of the 
bank’s business (i.e. domestic offices only file FFIEC-041 or domestic and foreign 
offices file FFIEC-031). The bank data employed in our paper is available through 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation statistics on depository institutions (SDI) 
database at the following website: http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp (last 
accessed on 8/15/2012).     
Since our paper works with bank-level data, we used data from the lead bank in 
the case of multibank holding companies (BHC). In many instances the lead bank 
commonly represents over 80% of the total insured assets reported by the BHC3. 
Banks with missing balance sheet and/or income information required for this study 
are excluded from the sample. In keeping with Loutskina (2011), to minimize the 
impact of outliers we eliminate all bank-quarter data with asset growth over the 
preceding quarter in excess of 50%, total loan growth exceeding 100%, or total-loans-
to-asset ratio less than 10%. Application of the same criteria to the population of FDIC 
insured commercial banks removes 63,629 bank quarters from the initial data set4. 
The bank information extracted includes loan balances on various loan categories 
(e.g. total loans, commercial and industrial (C&I) and residential real estate loans), 
total assets, balance sheet liquidity measures (e.g. securities held to maturity, 
securities available for sale, cash and balances due, mortgage-backed securities and 
asset-backed securities, federal funds sold, and reverse REPOs), Tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio, cost of deposits (e.g. interest expense on deposits to total deposits), and 
various bank-deposit measures (e.g. total deposits that include demand deposits, 
money market accounts, savings accounts and time deposits, and transaction 
                                                     
3  To investigate the presence of multibank holding companies (MHC), we extracted a list of the 
largest 150 financial institutions as of the beginning of the sample. We matched each of these 
institutions against the FDIC website to determine if they were MHC. The number of banks excluded 
that formed part of a MHC represent less than 2% of the total sample (lead banks of MHC were 
retained for this research). 
4 In the initial data set there were 7,895 banks reported per quarter on average vs. 5,259 in the final 
data set. The maximum (minimum) number of reported banks in the initial data set was 8,215 at 
2007Q1and 7,223 at 2010Q4. The maximum (minimum) number of reported banks in the final data set 
was 5,482 at 20087Q2and 4,781 at 2005Q2.  
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deposits  that include demand deposits and NOW accounts). Appendix A provides 
further description of the bank variables. 
 
Table 1: Bank Descriptive Statistics - Panels A and B 
Panel A (TA < U.S. $1 billion) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Asset 114203 222758.20 194982.50 50003.00 2837389.00 
Net Loans 114203 151055.20 141077.60 7790.00 1414196.00 
Reloans 114203 48802.37 63016.87 0.00 756515.00 
Comloansdom 114203 19406.27 28146.41 0.00 1428146.00 
Rmbs 114203 15771.88 31819.75 0.00 1050181.00 
Abs 103615 106.47 2047.97 0.00 188895.00 
Sechmat 114203 6606.14 21999.03 -250952.00 550297.00 
Secfsale 114203 37180.44 47433.48 0.00 1082084.00 
Depdom 114203 174128.90 158104.90 500.00 2405441.00 
Cash 114203 10098.05 14622.51 -178.00 380620.00 
Ffsrepo 114203 4537.98 9470.27 0.00 438438.00 
Capt1r 114203 15.28 6.56 0.02 50.03 
Panel B (TA ≥ U.S. $1 billion and < U.S. $20 billion) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Asset 10930 3398152.00 3587482.00 502046.00 32700000.00 
Net Loans 10930 2293808.00 2489323.00 127300.00 22300000.00 
Reloans 10930 733581.00 1330553.00 0.00 19900000.00 
Comloansdom  10930 360635.00 562568.00 0.00 4850149.00 
Rmbs  10930 400613.00 716410.00 0.00 17100000.00 
Abs 9152 8169.00 74016.00 0.00 2354260.00 
Sechmat 10930 122859.00 450698.00 -183326.00 11800000.00 
Secfsale 10930 546362.00 801322.00 0.00 8178007.00 
Depdom 10930 2442229.00 2509636.00 0.00 30100000.00 
Cash 10930 141478.00 276098.00 10.00 4592160.00 
Ffsrepo 10930 45343.00 154659.00 0.00 2850000.00 
Capt1r 10930 12.30 5.02 0.00 50.00 
Notes: All bank variables are expressed in levels and in thousands of dollars with the 
exception of our Tier 1 risk-based capital variable (capt1r) which is in ratio form. The 
descriptive detail is on four sub samples of banks (panels A through D) measured by average 
total assets over the sample period. The sample covers from 2005Q1 to 2010Q4. Bank variable 
definitions are detailed in Appendix A: Bank Variables. The bank data was downloaded from 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDICs) statistics on depository institutions (SDI) 
database: http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp. The SDI information is extracted from 
quarterly call reports (FFIEC form FFIEC-031 for banks with domestic and foreign offices or 
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Table 1: Bank Descriptive Statistics – continued - Panels C and D 
Panel C (TA ≥ U.S. $20 billion and < U.S. $90 billion) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Asset 779 45900000.00 24800000.00 1582921.00 169000000.00 
Net Loans 779 27500000.00 16000000.00 1141757.00 125000000.00 
Reloans 779 8770274.00 7697717.00 0.00 39800000.00 
Comloansdom 779 5627078.00 5647719.00 0.00 25900000.00 
Rmbs 779 5439802.00 7402032.00 0.00 50100000.00 
Abs 598 770379.00 2017680.00 0.00 18500000.00 
Sechmat 779 1092533.00 2958350.00 -1532625.00 25100000.00 
Secfsale 779 7711980.00 8968807.00 0.00 68300000.00 
Depdom 779 28700000.00 18800000.00 901085.00 136000000.00 
Cash 779 2914472.00 5149576.00 361.00 38800000.00 
Ffsrepo 779 1011476.00 2286952.00 0.00 18000000.00 
Capt1r 779 12.75 6.78 6.25 47.72 
Panel D (TA ≥ U.S. $90 billion) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Asset 322 443000000.00 471000000.00 50900000.00 1770000000.00 
Net Loans 322 225000000.00 206000000.00 22400000.00 732000000.00 
Reloans 322 84900000.00 92300000.00 3052000.00 377000000.00 
Comloansdom 322 48400000.00 45800000.00 1985000.00 182000000.00 
Rmbs 322 46000000.00 54500000.00 1903217.00 253000000.00 
Abs 322 3743973.00 6136682.00 0.00 29200000.00 
Sechmat 322 1701747.00 6204059.00 0.00 47400000.00 
Secfsale 322 67100000.00 79100000.00 3430433.00 354000000.00 
Depdom 322 205000000.00 201000000.00 26800000.00 838000000.00 
Cash 322 27300000.00 40100000.00 1112825.00 228000000.00 
Ffsrepo 322 29300000.00 64100000.00 0.00 302000000.00 
Capt1r 322 8.76 1.72 6.13 15.17 
Notes: All bank variables are expressed in levels and in thousands of dollars with the 
exception of our Tier 1 risk-based capital variable (capt1r) which is in ratio form. The 
descriptive detail is on four sub samples of banks (panels A through D) measured by average 
total assets over the sample period. The sample covers from 2005Q1 to 2010Q4. Bank variable 
definitions are detailed in Appendix A: Bank Variables. The bank data was downloaded from 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDICs) statistics on depository institutions (SDI) 
database: http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp. The SDI information is extracted from 
quarterly call reports (FFIEC form FFIEC-031 for banks with domestic and foreign offices or 
form FFIEC-041 for banks with domestic offices only). 
 
Following the approach used by Verma and Jackson (2008), the bank sample is 
divided into four groups based on average total asset size as follows: small banks 
(average total assets < U.S. $1 billion), medium banks (average total assets ≥ U.S. $1 
billion and < U.S. $20 billion), large banks (average total assets ≥ U.S. $20 billion and 
< U.S. $90 billion) and money-center banks (average total assets  ≥ U.S. $90 
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billion).Table 1 presents descriptive information on the banks classified in the four 
groups following the four-size classification scheme. Some interesting results emerge 
under this alternative bank classification scheme. When scaled by mean total assets, 
banks’ exposure to total loans (net loans) declines as overall bank size rises. For 
example, the ratio of total-mean-loans-to-mean-assets is 0.678 for small banks 
identified in Table 1 Panel A, while this ratio falls to 0.599 for large banks shown in 
Table 1 Panel C. This finding is consistent with the view that bank size has typically 
affected the type of activities that banks engage in. For example, small banks 
generally focus on the retail side of banking, while large banks tend to emphasize 
wholesale banking. With the exception of the money-center banks (as shown in Table 
1 Panel D) it is equally interesting that the exposure to commercial loans, scaled by 
bank mean total assets, rises as overall bank size increases. The ratio of mean-
commercial-loans-to-mean-assets increases from 0.087 for small banks to 0.106 for 
medium banks and to 0.123 for large banks before dropping to 0.109 for money-center 
banks. This result is also consistent with the large banks’ tendency to focus on 
wholesale activities that include lending to larger corporations to support their 
capital expenditure and operating capital requirements, while small banks tend to 
lend to smaller and less sophisticated customers. The banks’ investments in real 
estate mortgage (rmbs) and asset-backed securities (abs) scaled by total assets 
increases with bank size. These ratios increase from 0.071 to 0.104 and from 0.000 to 
0.008 for rmbs and abs respectively for small banks compared to money-center banks. 
Analysis of the federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to 
resell (frepo) scaled balances reveals a similar finding: the ratio increases from 0.020 
to 0.066 when small banks are compared to money-center banks. 
On the balance sheet’s liability side the domestic deposits (depdom), scaled by 
mean total assets, and bank capitalization ratios (capt1r) decline as bank size 
increases. The ratio of mean-domestic-deposits-to-mean-assets decreases from 0.782 
for small banks to 0.463 for money-center banks. This finding supports the view that 
larger banks have greater access to capital and money markets, including REPOs, 
compared to their smaller counterparts. The findings suggest that large banks 
operate with lower equity capital ratios compared to small banks and that large banks 
tend to rely more on purchased funds such as Federal funds and lower levels of core 
deposits. 
The main variable of interest includes REPO spreads collateralized by real estate 
mortgage-backed securities. The REPO spread is the difference between the 90-day 
REPO rate for a given bond class and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS). Figure III 
portrays a REPO-OIS series with the collateral consisting of real estate mortgage-
backed securities (rmbs). This series is based on daily frequency and covers the time 
frame 12/31/04 to 12/31/10. Brunnermeier (2009) suggests that banks rely on REPO 
markets in addition to other markets such as the commercial paper, federal funds, 
and interbank markets to finance their activities. Based on Figure III the REPO-OIS 
spread is at its widest point during the peak period of the crisis between 2007Q3 and 
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2008Q4. Gorton and Metrick (2012) suggest that by late summer 2007 an initial shock 
had occurred that negatively impacted the securitization markets in particular high-
grade tranches that commonly served as collateral in the REPO markets. Figure III 
illustrates the full impact of the crisis during the second half of 2008. This period 
included events such as the Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual bankruptcies 
and AGI’s U.S. government bailout in September, as well as the TARP U.S. 
government bailout in October 2008.  
 
Figure III REPO-(OIS) Spreads R/E Backed Collateral 
  
Source: The 90 day Repurchase Agreement (REPO) series RPMB03M with collateral 
consisting of real estate mortgage backed (RMBS) and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) 
series USSOC Curncy are expressed in daily frequency and are downloaded from the 
Bloomberg database http://www.bloomberg.com. The spread was computed by 
subtracting the OIS series from the REPO series. The author computes a quarterly average 
REPO-OIS spread series from the daily data. The quarterly series is used for model purposes. 
The REPO markets allow banks and other market participants to obtain collateralized 
funding by selling owned securities while agreeing to repurchase them at loan maturity. 
 
The REPO spread series and 90-day LIBOR-OIS spread are downloadable from 
Bloomberg’s database: http://www.bloomberg.com (data retrieved on 8/15/2012). 
The TED spread series are downloadable from the Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED) database available through the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (data retrieved on 8/15/2012). To control for 
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Domestic Product (RGDP) growth rate variable is computed using quarterly data on 
RGDP expressed in Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars (Series GDPC1), available from 
the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis website: 
http://bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (data retrieved on 8/15/2012). To proxy 
for the stance of monetary policy we incorporate the effective federal funds rate that 
is available through Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (data retrieved on 8/15/2012) and is measured 
in monthly frequency. A quarterly FEDFUNDS series is formed from the monthly 
series since the bank variables are measured in a quarterly frequency. 
Table 2 Panels A through D presents contemporaneous bivariate correlations for 
the independent bank variables and macroeconomic variables that are employed in 
the lending models for the four subsamples of banks. The bank total assets are 
presented in log form (lta) while the liquidity (Liq I) and deposit variables (Dep I and 
Dep II) are scaled by total assets. The liquidity measure includes cash in banks and 
securities held to maturity and available for sale. Deposit I includes demand deposits, 
money market deposits, saving deposits, and time deposits. Deposit II is a narrower 
measure that captures demand deposits and NOW accounts that are collectively 
considered transaction deposits. Residential real estate loans (reloans) are scaled by 
total loans. The Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (capt1r) and deposit cost (depcost) 
variables are presented in ratio form. The former represents the ratio of bank Tier-1-
capital-to-total-risk-weighted-assets while the latter is the ratio of bank interest-
expense-on-deposits-to-total-deposits. 
Table 2 suggests that bank behavior is not necessarily fully consistent across the 
bank subsamples. For example, correlation between bank total assets (lta) and 
residential real estate loan portfolios (reloans) is moderate (0.313) for money-center 
banks (refer to Table 2 Panel D) yet the correlation turns to a negative for large banks 
(see Table 2 Panel C) and to negligible correlation coefficients for small and medium 
banks as shown in Table 2 Panels A and B, respectively. Another interesting 
correlation pattern emerges between the liquidity variable and total assets in the four 
bank subsamples. The moderate and negative correlation of -0.156 for the small banks 
in Table 2 Panel A suggests that increases in liquidity are not accompanied by a 
contemporaneous increase in balance sheet assets, and thus increases in liquidity 
may simply have been part of an effort to recapitalize the banks whose balances 
sheets had been negatively impacted by losses. It is puzzling that the correlation 
matrix reflects a negative relationship between the deposit variables and total assets. 
Typically we would expect strong positive correlations between deposit variables 
and total assets, especially in the case of small to medium banks, given the high 
degree of leverage that banks typically operate with. Normally, small to medium 
banks are able to control the size of their balance sheet through their deposit 
gathering efforts which to some extent are driven by the banks’ deposit pricing 
strategies. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix Independent Variables 
Panel A Small Bank Subsample (TA < U.S. $1 billion) 
 Lta Liq I Dep I Dep II  Reloans Capt1r Depcost Repo-Ois Ffr Rgdpg 
Lta 1.000          
Liq I -0.156 1.000         
Dep I -0.252 0.248 1.000        
Dep II -0.417 0.286 0.636 1.000       
Reloans 0.010 0.098 -0.008 -0.029 1.000      
Capt1r -0.175 0.324 -0.129 0.015 0.176 1.000     
Depcost 0.044 -0.057 -0.146 -0.118 0.007 -0.074 1.000    
Repo-Ois 0.034 -0.047 -0.041 -0.047 -0.038 -0.050 0.005 1.000   
Ffr -0.113 -0.035 0.029 0.066 -0.017 0.055 0.073 -0.279 1.000  
Rgdpg -0.039 0.047 0.042 0.047 0.036 0.053 0.014 -0.793 0.350 1.000 
Panel B Medium Bank Subsample (TA ≥ U.S. $1 billion and < U.S. $20 billion) 
 Lta Liq I Dep I Dep II Reloans Capt1r Depcost Repo-Ois Ffr Rgdpg 
Lta 1.000          
Liq I 0.119 1.000         
Dep I -0.231 -0.187 1.000        
Dep II -0.125 0.069 0.202 1.000       
Reloans 0.004 0.234 -0.073 -0.038 1.000      
Capt1r -0.045 0.408 -0.245 -0.060 0.168 1.000     
Depcost -0.070 -0.153 -0.081 -0.138 -0.052 -0.056 1.000    
Repo-Ois 0.053 -0.082 -0.072 -0.108 -0.021 -0.063 0.286 1.000   
Ffr -0.148 -0.065 -0.034 0.108 -0.008 -0.018 0.243 -0.279 1.000  
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Panel C Large Bank Subsample (TA ≥U.S. $20 billion and < U.S. $90 billion) 
 Lta Liq I Dep I Dep II Reloans Capt1r Depcost Repo-Ois Ffr Rgdpg 
Lta 1.000          
Liq I 0.082 1.000         
Dep I -0.151 -0.137 1.000        
Dep II -0.037 0.159 0.067 1.000       
Reloans -0.101 0.362 0.121 0.208 1.000      
Capt1r -0.128 0.080 -0.296 -0.011 -0.110 1.000     
Depcost -0.162 -0.272 0.050 -0.201 -0.120 -0.117 1.000    
Repo-Ois 0.141 -0.029 -0.030 0.000 -0.032 -0.085 0.265 1.000   
Ffr -0.360 -0.136 -0.034 -0.046 0.011 -0.083 0.349 -0.279 1.000  
Rgdpg -0.145 0.028 0.017 0.013 0.037 0.078 -0.082 -0.793 0.350 1.000 
Panel D Money-center Bank Subsample (TA ≥ U.S. $90 billion) 
 Lta Liq I Dep I Dep II Reloans Capt1r Depcost Repo-Ois Ffr Rgdpg 
Lta 1.000          
Liq I -0.011 1.000         
Dep I -0.471 -0.385 1.000        
Dep II -0.187 0.526 0.167 1.000       
Reloans 0.313 -0.443 0.324 -0.036 1.000      
Capt1r 0.116 0.426 -0.113 0.079 -0.028 1.000     
Depcost -0.079 -0.339 -0.005 -0.279 0.033 -0.320 1.000    
Repo-Ois 0.061 -0.035 -0.035 -0.050 -0.058 -0.144 0.201 1.000   
Ffr -0.137 -0.226 -0.084 -0.059 0.041 -0.487 0.425 -0.279 1.000  
Rgdpg -0.061 0.022 0.006 0.049 0.057 0.086 -0.012 -0.793 0.350 1.000 
Note:  The bank total assets (lta) variable enters in log form. The liquidity (liq I) and deposit (dep I & II) variables are scaled by bank total 
assets while residential real estate loan (reloans) variable is scaled by bank total loans. Tier1 risk-based capital (capt1r) and deposit cost 
(depcost) variables are in ratio form. Refer to Appendix A for listing of the bank variable names and codes. Bank data was obtained from 
FDICs statistics on depository institutions (SDI) website http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp last accessed pm 8/15/12. The bivariate 
correlations cover the entire sample period from 2005Q1 to 2010Q4. The correlation matrix includes the macroeconomic variables used in 
this study along with the REPO-OIS spread which is a key variable employed in this research. Author’s calculations. 
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With the exception of the money-center bank sample reported in Table 2 Panel D, the 
correlation between the bank tier1 capital ratio (capt1r) and bank total assets (lta) is 
negative ranging from -0.045 for the medium banks in Panel B to -0.175 for small bank 
in Table 2 Panel A. The negative correlations do not support the view that an increase 
in capitalization is accompanied by a contemporaneous increase in bank lending or 
some other expansion of the balance sheet such as liquidity build up with a 
concurrent stabilization of the banks’ lending portfolio. This finding also supports 
the view that the banking system experienced an overall period of recapitalization in 
part spawned by the effects of the financial crisis. Table 2 also suggests that deposit 
costs (depcost) and various rate measures such as the REPO-OIS spread (REPO-OIS) 
and federal funds rates (ffr) have the strongest correlations with bank total assets of 
large banks as reflected on Panel C. With the exception of the negative correlation 
between the REPO-OIS spread with the RGDP growth rate variable (rgdpg) of -0.793, 
all other correlations are either low or moderate as seen in Panels A through D of 
Table 2. The low to moderate correlations help mitigate any potential collinearity 
issues that could impact the lending models while in no model do we allow for the 
REPO-OIS spread and the RGDP variables to enter simultaneously. 
4. Methodology  
We employ dynamic panel estimation to: 1) model the effect of REPO spreads on 
bank- lending behavior, and 2) model the effect of bank’s exposure in residential real 
estate portfolios on bank-lending behavior. The model incorporates various control 
variables including bank-specific variables measuring asset size, balance sheet 
liquidity, bank capitalization, deposits, and deposit costs as described in the 
preceding Data Section. The bank-control variables capture supply-side lending 
constraints that are common to bank lending models (refer to Altunbas et al. (2009) 
and Cornett et al. (2011)).  
We also include macroeconomic variables such as a real GDP growth rate and an 
effective federal funds rate. The real GDP growth rate controls for loan demand (see 
Berger and Udell (2004) and Lei (2013)) while the interest rates series is commonly 
associated with the bank-lending channel (BLC) literature. The BLC posits that 
monetary policy may be transmitted to the real economy through its effects on bank 
loans and that a tightening in monetary policy diminishes firm’s bank loan supply.  
The model is expressed as follows: 
 
tiitttitititi macrorepoRRELbkLL ,54,3,21,1. εµβββββ ++++++∆=∆ −   (1) 
 
where the ∆  prefix indicates the change of the bank loan variable L which is 
expressed in log form; bk represents a vector of the following bank specific variables: 
1) bank total assets (TA) expressed in log form, 2) a balance sheet liquidity measure 
(Liq) that is scaled by total assets and defined as the sum of cash in banks and 
securities held to maturity and available for sale, 3) bank capitalization (Cap) 
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measured as the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, 4) two deposit measures (Dep I and 
Dep II) that are scaled by total assets with Deposit I consisting of the sum of demand 
deposits, money market deposits, saving deposits, and time deposits and Deposit II 
capturing demand deposits and NOW accounts that are collectively considered 
transaction deposits, and 5) the cost of deposits (Dc) defined as the ratio of interest-
expense-on-deposits-to-total-deposits; RREL expresses the banks’ residential real 
estate portfolio scaled by total loans (net loans); repo measures the REPO-OIS spread; 
and macro represents a vector of macroeconomic variables. The macro vector includes 
an effective federal funds rate and the real GDP growth rate (RGDP). Finally, µ
captures the time-invariant bank-specific effects, while ε  denotes the remaining 
disturbance term. 
Equation 1 follows the fixed effects loan specification Cornett et al. (2011) used 
while introducing some important improvements 5 . First, a fixed effects model 
assumes that agents (banks in our case) are myopic and that observations in time are 
independent. Our dynamic approach allows banks to behave dynamically to form 
expectations about future values of the variables. Moreover, as Arellano and Bond 
(1991) explain, our estimation is consistent with rational expectation models in which 
agents use all available information to form expectations. This is important because, 
for example, bank-specific variable expectations might affect the bank’s present 
strategy on lending decisions. Our dynamic approach is also motivated by the fact 
that bank lending is a dynamic process that is driven by multiple criteria that takes 
into account many factors, such as business cycle conditions, bank loan portfolio 
performance, bank financial attributes and constraints, competition, and loan 
demand. Second, allowing for dynamics and our choice of estimators also helps us 
control for potential endogeneity. Third, the above specification introduces the repo 
spread variable which is the main variable of interest for this research. Since 
traditional funding costs are suspected to have a reduced impact on lending as a 
result of expanded securitization, equation 1 tests for this transition towards 
alternative bank funding sources by retaining a deposit cost variable (Dc) that is 
included in the vector of bank variables bk. Fourth, unlike Cornett et al. (2011) who 
incorporate a TED spread as the only macroeconomic variable, equation 1 
incorporates additional macro variables that are commonly used in the BLC literature. 
The bank variables are normalized with respect to their average across all banks in a 
given sample similar to the specification used by Matousek and Sarantis (2009). The 
Tier 1 risk-based capital variable (capt1r) and the cost of deposit measure (Dc) are 
reported in ratio form. The normalization of the bank specific variables takes the 
following form: 
                                                     
5 Altunbas et al. (2009) and  Matousek and Sarantis (2009) employ dynamic panel estimation to 
model bank lending behavior in European Countries; the basis of their models bear resemblance to 
the model introduced  in this paper.  Our model also draws from bank lending models proposed by 
Kishan and Opiela (2000), Ashcraft (2006), and Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) who examine lending 
behavior by U.S banks. 
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where i  = 1,…..N;  t = 1,…..T;  and N  is the number of banks and T is the 
time period; TAi,t are the total assets of bank i in quarter t; Liqi,t is the ratio of bank i 
liquid assets as defined in the data section divided by bank i total assets in quarter t; 
Capi,t is the ratio of bank i Tier 1 capital divided by bank i total risk weighted assets 
(RWA) in quarter t;  Depi,t  is the ratio of bank deposits based on various measures 
as defined in the data section divided by bank i total assets in quarter t; and Dci,t is 
the ratio of bank i interest expense on deposits divided by bank i total deposits in 
quarter t. 
While we focus on the impact of REPO spreads on bank lending, the inclusion of 
FFR in the model aligns with empirical research that investigates the presence of a 
BLC and with our underlying research purpose. We examine whether the subprime 
mortgage market crisis (i.e. a bank liquidity shock) impacts the supply of bank 
lending in a BLC framework. The intent is to capture the impact of the subprime 
mortgage market crisis through changes in the banks’ residential real estate portfolio 
exposure. Under our securitization theme, a-priori we would expect a general 
tendency for larger banks to be more active in the securitization markets and rely on 
complex funding sources including greater use of REPO agreements. Moreover, the 
BLC literature suggests the BLC’s effectiveness is impacted by banks’ asset size, 
liquidity, and capital with smaller banks tending to be more responsive to monetary 
policy changes as measured by FFR. 
We employ the system GMM (SGMM) dynamic panel data estimator proposed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998).6 This estimator starts by taking first differences in 
                                                     
6    We also employed the difference GMM (DGMM) dynamic panel estimator as proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and the central findings remain qualitatively unchanged. Blundell and Bond 
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equation 1 to remove the time-invariant bank-specific effects µ. Then a vector of 
instruments Z is needed to construct moments E(∆εZ) = 0. Under serially 
uncorrelated ε, lags of the right-hand-side variables in equation 1 are valid 
instruments. The SGMM augments the moment conditions obtained in the difference 
equation with moments from the equation in levels, E[(µ+ε)W] = 0. Blundell and Bond 
propose using lags of the right-hand-side variables in the equation in differences as 
instruments W. 7  Altunbas et al. (2009) points out that SGMM is efficient and 
consistent contingent on the absence of first-order serial correlation and the validity 
of the instruments. We provide two tests to validate our empirical approach. A 
second-order serial correlation test on the differenced error term is used to assess 
whether the assumption of no first-order serial correlation is met. To test the overall 
validity of the instrument Z and W we use the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions. 
Some of our right-hand side regressors in equation 1 are potentially endogenous. 
For example, an increase in bank lending funded through increased deposits or other 
external liabilities, ceteris paribus, would lead to an increase in bank total assets. 
Changes in lending activity may also have an effect on bank total assets because loans 
from an accounting perspective are included in banks’ total assets. Also, findings are 
mixed on the causation relationship between bank lending and output. The direction 
of the causation between bank lending and output is based on the idea that many 
small bank-dependent firms are unable to access alternative forms of financing which 
leads to economic fluctuations.  Another example deals with lending and balance 
sheet liquidity which might be jointly determined because banks have managerial 
discretion to choose both, lending and liquidity, levels simultaneously during the 
same period. Banks need to choose an optimal level of liquid assets to meet demands 
from depositors and borrowers. Based on this analysis, we model bank total assets, 
liquidity, and real GDP growth rate as endogenous. 
To investigate the impact of the financial crisis on bank lending, we propose 
several specifications that expand the benchmark model. First, following Kishan and 
Opiela (2000) and Cornett et al. (2011), the bank sample is divided into four asset size 
classes to better isolate the impact of the various financial constraints on bank loan 
supply. Second, given the relatively high correlation of -0.793 between the REPO-OIS 
spread and the RGDP growth rate variable as reported in Table 2, we replace the 
REPO-OIS spread with the RGDP growth rate variable under alternative 
specifications that model bank lending behavior. Third, similar to Cornett et al. (2011), 
we allow for the interaction between an indicator variable identified as a Crisis 
variable to capture the impact of the financial crisis and certain bank variables such 
as residential real estate portfolio, bank deposits, and Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio. 
                                                     
(1998) point out that when the series are persistent over time, the instruments in the DGMM are weak. 
Hence our focus on our preferred estimator, the SGMM.  
7 We use the two-step method of moments estimator. 
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The Crisis dummy variable is assigned a value of one during the crisis period from 
2007Q3 to 2008Q4 and zero otherwise. The idea behind the interaction terms is to 
determine whether the effects of the crisis, measured through the crisis indicator 
variable, operate through the bank variables. For example, banks with high risk 
exposure in their residential real estate portfolios would be expected to reduce new 
lending activity more than banks with lower risk exposure in their residential real 
estate portfolios during the crisis period. Fourth, we explore the asymmetric effects 
of the REPO-OIS spread on bank lending through its interaction with the Crisis 
variable. A priori, we would expect that during the crisis period, rising REPO-OIS 
spreads would have served to discourage banks from granting new bank credit, to 
the extent that REPO financing represents an important source of bank financing. 
Since the Sargan test on the validity of over-identifying restrictions is not robust 
to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the error terms, for model diagnostic 
purposes we choose to apply and report the Hansen J statistic which is a well-
accepted standard specification check used with two-step SGMM. Roodman (2009b) 
explains that the J-test is a test of instrument validity but it can also be viewed as a 
structural specification test. The Hansen test is robust to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, but is usually weakened in the presence of a 
high instrument count. The number of instruments in this model is relatively low, 
thus deemed to not be a matter of concern. Using system GMM estimation, we have 
between 16 and 20 instruments depending on the model specification after imposing 
restrictions on the instrument matrix8. 
5. Hypotheses 
We identify four testable hypotheses regarding the impact of securitization on 
bank lending during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The literature proposes that 
development of the securitization market offers an important alternative funding 
source for banks, especially for the larger banks. Loutskina (2011) claims that the 
securitization process not only represents a substitute for on balance sheet liquidity 
but also serves as a mechanism to finance loans when the absence of available 
external financing constrains funds . The idea is that if banks can liquidate their loans 
to support their liquidity needs, they can also do so to supply new credit thereby 
making banks less dependent on the traditional funding sources. It follows that the 
change in the intermediation process brought upon by securitization, whereby funds 
                                                     
8 The SGMM estimation was performed on STATA software using xtabond2 program code written 
by Roodman (2009a). Under this program code, “gmmstyle” variable list includes endogenous 
variables while “ivstyle” variable list includes exogenous variables. In our model, gmmstyle variables 
include bank total assets, liquidity, and real GDP growth. All other model variables are ivstyle 
variables. The collapse command restricts the number of instruments in a manner that a single 
instrument is created for each variable and lag distance rather than an instrument for each time period, 
variable, and lag distance. This is useful to support our choice of the Hansen statistic to validate the 
instrument list. 
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from ultimate suppliers (households/lenders) are channeled to the ultimate 
borrowers, should lead to changes in bank funding costs to the extent that banks can 
access this new funding source. For those banks that cannot readily access 
securitization markets in a cost effective manner, we expect an inverse relationship 
between rising bank deposit costs and bank lending. The empirical literature that 
explores the bank-lending channel (BLC) finds that securitization has impacted the 
effectiveness of monetary policy to influence the supply of bank loans. The 
implication is that securitization enhances bank liquidity and reduces banks’ funding 
needs in the event of monetary tightening.  This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Traditional bank funding costs measured through established monetary rates 
play a diminished role in the supply of bank lending for larger banks. Since 
traditional bank funding costs are proxied by (Dc), a variable included in the vector 
of bank variables in equation 1, bank funding costs have a negative effect on bank 
lending. We hypothesize   β2 ≤ 0 in equation 1with respect to (Dc) for the smaller 
bank samples. 
 
Altunbas et al. (2009) suggests that the advent of securitization has likely altered 
bank characteristics such as size, on balance sheet liquidity ratios, and capital 
requirements that are usually emphasized in the literature to identify shifts in loan 
supply. The literature suggests that the securitization process serves to reduce 
regulatory capital requirements by offloading credit risk from the loan portfolio. The 
capital relief resulting from securitization may lead to, ceteris paribus, a bank loan 
supply increase. Therefore, an active securitization market provides banks with an 
additional source of both loan funding and liquidity. Loutskina (2011) suggests that 
as the banks’ ability to securitize loans increases, their balance sheet’s liquid assets 
holdings decreases. She also claims that since liquid funds and loans are two core 
components of bank assets, a decrease in liquid funds leads to an offsetting increase 
in lending. The literature suggests that business-cycle conditions increase 
securitization during economic expansion periods due to lower investor uncertainty 
regarding the securitized asset valuation. At the same time, banks with heavy 
reliance on securitization for liquidity and loan funding needs are more vulnerable 
to economic shocks when the market for securitized assets is disrupted. This implies 
that in the absence of a strong market for securitized assets, banks must hold enough 
liquid funds to provide liquidity to borrowers and depositors on demand. Hence, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H2: REPO spreads narrow (widen) in times of economic expansion (contraction) and 
its effects on bank loan supply attenuate (intensify) during expansionary 
(contractionary) periods. We hypothesize asymmetric REPO effects on bank lending 
captured in β4 in equation 1. 
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The banks’ residential real estate loans are the key asset that allowed for the 
development of the securitization process. During the pre-financial crisis period, 
banks were able to sell loans to either finance their liquidity needs or fund new 
lending. During the financial crisis when funding liquidity dried up the residential 
real estate portfolio became an illiquid asset held by banks. It is plausible the 
subprime mortgage market collapse generated a negative liquidity shock to the banks 
that recorded large losses and significant write-downs in their real estate mortgage 
portfolios. It is also conceivable the degree of the liquidity shock would be directly 
related to the level of concentration in the lending portfolio tied to real estate 
mortgage lending and related mortgage-backed securities. Additionally, we expect 
that an increase in liquidity risk exposure, captured by the level of the banks’ 
residential real estate portfolio, would hinder the banks’ capacity to generate new 
lending. We argue that banks that are relatively illiquid during financial crises and 
would need to increase liquid assets holdings which would in turn restrict bank 
lending. Since banks choose liquidity levels and lending jointly this leads to the third 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: During the financial crisis a bank’s exposure in its residential real estate lending 
portfolio, RREL scaled by total loans has a negative effect on overall bank lending. 
We hypothesize β3 < 0 in equation 1. 
 
Cornett et al. (2011) show that banks that are more exposed to liquidity risk 
stemming from exposure to unfunded loan commitments, the withdrawal of 
wholesale deposits, or the loss of other sources of short term financing tend to hoard 
cash and other liquid assets in times of crisis. It is expected that during recessionary 
periods, and certainly during a financial crisis, that non- financial firms’ increased 
reliance on bank funding would be inversely related to their balance sheet strength 
measured in terms of internal liquidity. On this premise, the composition of the banks’ 
lending portfolio would reflect the banks’ degree of liquidity risk as noted above. It 
follows that a bank’s capacity to generate new loans diminishes as its exposure to 
liquidity risk rises. Banks may respond by rationing credit if anticipated liquidity 
needs are likely to be high.  Cornett et al. (2011) also point out that, based on explicit 
and implicit government backing, transaction deposits (a.k.a. core deposits) 
consisting of demand deposit accounts, NOW accounts, and certificates of deposit 
under the FDIC coverage threshold are unlikely to leave the banking system during 
a crisis. Cornett et al. (2011) find that banks with stable sources of funding (i.e. higher 
reliance on core deposits and equity capital) are less constrained by the financial crisis 
and therefore are able to continue to lend. They also suggest that during the 2007-
2009 financial crisis funds were leaving the securities market and flowing into the 
banking system, with most of these funds going into deposit accounts. If transaction 
deposits, along with bank capital, represent stable sources of financing during the 
2007-2009 financial crisis, then banks with higher levels of deposits and capital would 
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be more willing to roll down their liquidity cushions to support bank lending. This 
argument leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4: During the financial crisis bank deposits scaled by total asset have a positive effect 
on overall bank lending. Since bank transaction deposits are proxied by (Dep II), a 
variable included in the vector of bank variables in equation 1, we hypothesize β2 > 
0 in equation 1 with respect to (Dep II).  
6. Results 
Tables 3 through 6 present model specifications using the system GMM estimator 
applied to the small, medium, large, and money center bank samples respectively. 
The dependent variable in all models is the one period change in bank net loans and 
leases that enters the model in log form. These tables introduce various model 
specifications with Model 1 representing the benchmark model for this research.  
Under these specifications we allow for feedback effects from bank lending to total 
assets, liquidity, and real GDP growth rate variables.  
Overall we find empirical support for hypothesis H1 which suggests that 
traditional bank funding costs play a diminished role in the supply of bank lending 
for the larger banks (i.e. β2 ≤ 0 in equation 1). The negative effect of bank funding 
costs on bank lending is well captured in the medium bank sample under the 
dynamic panel specifications as reported in Table 4. Contrary to expectations, we find 
a positive significant relationship between bank funding costs and bank lending in 
the small bank sample as reported in several model specifications in Table 3. Our 
results are consistent with Loutskina and Strahan (2009) who point out that strong 
loan demand may spur an increased appetite for deposits required to fund new loans 
that potentially may lead to higher deposit yields (i.e. a positive relationship between 
deposit costs and loan growth). The fact that variability in deposit costs does not 
explain bank lending growth in the large and money-center samples is also consistent 
with H1 since the larger banks should have greater access to the securitization 
markets which has become an important alternative funding source. 
Evidence supports hypothesis H2 which posits asymmetric effects of the REPO-
OIS spread on bank lending (i.e. β4 in equation 1 interacted with the crisis dummy 
variable). However, the results suggest the presence of asymmetric affects that are 
limited to the small and medium-bank samples. Since the REPO-OIS spread can be 
viewed as a funding cost we expect that its impact permeates across all banks that 
use this type of funding source that is commonly associated with larger banks. While 
asymmetry that is detected in the small and medium-bank samples is an interesting 
finding, the absence of asymmetry in the remaining bank samples is somewhat 
surprising. It is possible that bank lending by the larger banks is not impacted by an 
increase in the REPO-OIS spread due to offsetting income generated from 
securitization activities which include underwriting and sale of securities as 
mentioned by Shleifer and Vishny (2010).  
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Table 3: Dynamic panel models. Dependent variable: Bank lending growth, small bank sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Loan growth (1-lag) 0.035 0.012 0.321*** 0.329*** 0.311*** 0.321*** 0.311*** 0.018 
Bank Total Assets normalized 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.018** 0.021*** 0.019** 0.021*** 0.017** 0.033*** 
Bank Liquidity-I  normalized -0.204*** -0.169*** -0.143*** -0.112*** -0.145*** -0.114*** -0.147*** -0.206*** 
Bank Tier 1 Capital normalized 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bank Deposits- I normalized 0.012***  0.008***  0.008***  0.009*** 0.012*** 
Bank Deposits- II normalized  0.015***  0.021***  0.022***   
Bank Deposit Costs normalized 0.004* 0.002 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 0.004* 
Real Estate Loans normalized -0.254*** -0.312*** -0.182*** -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.190*** -0.182*** -0.258*** 
REPO-OIS Spread 0.010*** 0.010***      0.000 
Federal funds Rate 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
Real GDP Growth Rate   -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
Crisis dummy     -0.002* 0.000 0.000 -0.004*** 
Real Estate Loans normalized*crisis     0.008***    
Bank Deposits- II normalized*crisis      -0.011   
Bank Tier 1 Capital normalized*crisis      -0.001***  
REPO-OIS Spread * crisis        0.012*** 
Hansen  Test-Chi square 89.090 87.480 307.300 315.960 308.030 317.260 308.220 87.490 
Prob > Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB(1) z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB(2) z 0.028 0.005 0.350 0.303 0.415 0.353 0.422 0.017 
Notes: Sample period 2005Q1-2010Q4. The dependent variable net loans and leases, and bank total assets enter the models in log form. The liquidity and bank deposit measures are scaled by 
bank total assets while the residential real estate loan variable is scaled by bank total loans. Liquidity I includes cash in banks and securities held to maturity and available for sale. Deposit I 
measures domestic deposits consisting of the sum of demand deposits, money market deposits, saving deposits and time deposits.  Deposit II captures demand deposits and NOW accounts 
aka transaction deposits.  The bank Tier 1 capital and the bank deposit cost variables are expressed in ratio form. All right hand side bank variables are normalized with respect to their 
averages across all banks in a given sample. The models employ the Blundell-Bond (1998) two-step estimator. The Hansen tests report the orthogonal conditions of over-identifying restrictions 
of the instruments as a group under the null that over-identifying restrictions are valid, i.e. exogeneity of instruments.  AB (1) and AB (2) refer to Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests under 
the null of no autocorrelation in the first differenced error terms. Corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1% 
respectively. Bank total assets, liquidity and real GDP growth are treated as endogenous in all models. The sample size of small banks is 4,982. Small banks are defined as those banks with 
total assets less than U.S. $1 billion as of the beginning of the sample period. There are 95,421 observations in each model run. Models 1 and 2 employ 16 instruments, Models 3, 4, and 8 use 
18 instruments while Models 5, 6, and 7 use 20 instruments. 
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Table 4: Dynamic panel models. Dependent variable: Bank lending growth, medium bank sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Loan growth (1-lag) 0.200 0.351* 0.391*** 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.351*** 0.369*** 0.174 
Bank Total Assets normalized 0.016 0.035 0.025 0.043* 0.025 0.041* -0.024 0.019 
Bank Liquidity-I  normalized -0.213** -0.190* -0.124 -0.142* -0.139* -0.153* -0.138* -0.227** 
Bank Tier 1 Capital normalized -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
Bank Deposits- I normalized -0.230***  -0.238***  -0.237***  -0.237*** -0.227*** 
Bank Deposits- II normalized  0.021  0.058  0.074   
Bank Deposit Costs normalized 1.193*** -0.849*** -1.096** -0.886** -1.093** -0.953** -1.088** -1.170*** 
Real Estate Loans normalized -0.148** -0.099 -0.122* -0.136** -0.133** -0.141** -0.131** -0.149** 
REPO-OIS Spread 0.015*** 0.015***      0.000 
Federal Funds Rate 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
Real GDP Growth Rate   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Crisis dummy     0.004 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.002 
Real Estate Loans normalized*crisis     0.015    
Bank Deposits-II normalized*crisis      -0.101**   
Bank Tier 1 Capital normalized*crisis      0.000  
REPO-OIS Spread * crisis        0.016*** 
Hansen Test-Chi square 12.600 8.380 14.710 1.670 14.020 9.960 14.060 12.900 
Prob > Chi-square 0.050 0.211 0.065 0.221 0.081 0.268 0.080 0.045 
AB(1) z 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
AB(2) z 0.884 0.115 0.248 0.286 0.285 0.329 0.287 0.958 
Notes: Sample period 2005Q1-2010Q4. The dependent variable net loans and leases, and bank total assets enter the models in log form. The liquidity and bank deposit measures are scaled 
by bank total assets while the residential real estate loan variable is scaled by bank total loans. Liquidity I includes cash in banks and securities held to maturity and available for sale. 
Deposit I measures domestic deposits consisting of the sum of demand deposits, money market deposits, saving deposits and time deposits.  Deposit II captures demand deposits and 
NOW accounts aka transaction deposits.  The bank Tier 1 capital and the bank deposit cost variables are expressed in ratio form. All right hand side bank variables are normalized with 
respect to their averages across all banks in a given sample. The models employ the Blundell-Bond (1998) two-step estimator. The Hansen tests report the orthogonal conditions of over-
identifying restrictions of the instruments as a group under the null that over-identifying restrictions are valid, i.e. exogeneity of instruments.  AB (1) and AB (2) refer to Arellano-Bond 
serial correlation tests under the null of no autocorrelation in the first differenced error terms. Corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to 
levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1% respectively. Bank total assets, liquidity and real GDP growth are treated as endogenous in all models. There are 475 banks in the sample of medium 
banks defined as those banks with total assets ranging between U.S. $1 billion and $20 billion as of the beginning of the sample period. There are 9,353 observations in each model run. 
Models 1 and 2 employ 16 instruments, Models 3, 4, and 8 use 18 instruments while Models 5, 6, and 7 use 20 instruments. 
 
80                           Banking and Finance Review                      2 • 2015 
Table 5: Dynamic panel models. Dependent variable: Bank lending growth, large bank sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Loan growth (1-lag) 0.099 -0.149 -0.285 -0.247 -0.178 -0.176 -0.246 0.105 
Bank Total Assets normalized -0.019 -0.062 -0.069 -0.065 -0.056 -0.047 -0.057 -0.018 
Bank Liquidity-I  normalized 0.529** 0.180 0.450*** 0.305 0.455** 0.351 0.443** 0.513** 
Bank Tier 1 Capital normalized -0.012** -0.008 -0.010*** -0.008** -0.009** -0.008** -0.009** -0.011** 
Bank Deposits- I normalized -0.171  -0.267  -0.190  -0.198 -0.160 
Bank Deposits- II normalized  -0.092  -0.252  -0.139   
Bank Deposit Costs normalized 1.943 1.328 1.809 1.649 1.774 1.546 1.960 1.901 
Real Estate Loans normalized 0.105 0.258 0.147 0.128 0.183 0.146 0.169 0.108 
REPO-OIS Spread 0.020 0.021      0.001 
Federal Funds Rate 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008 
Real GDP Growth Rate   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
Crisis dummy     0.047 0.024 0.025 0.006 
Real Estate Loans normalized*crisis     -0.071    
Bank Deposits- II normalized*crisis      -0.173   
Bank Tier 1 Capital normalized*crisis      -0.002  
REPO-OIS Spread * crisis        0.015 
Hansen Test-Chi square 2.120 2.220 3.410 4.840 4.320 5.270 3.980 2.070 
Prob > Chi-square 0.908 0.898 0.906 0.775 0.827 0.729 0.859 0.913 
AB(1) z 0.156 0.581 0.317 0.367 0.168 0.243 0.237 0.131 
AB(2) z 0.805 0.897 0.411 0.584 0.636 0.694 0.472 0.750 
Notes: Sample period 2005Q1-2010Q4. The dependent variable net loans and leases, and bank total assets enter the models in log form. The liquidity and bank deposit measures are scaled by 
bank total assets while the residential real estate loan variable is scaled by bank total loans. Liquidity I includes cash in banks and securities held to maturity and available for sale. Deposit I 
measures domestic deposits consisting of the sum of demand deposits, money market deposits, saving deposits and time deposits.  Deposit II captures demand deposits and NOW accounts 
aka transaction deposits.  The bank Tier 1 capital and the bank deposit cost variables are expressed in ratio form. All right hand side bank variables are normalized with respect to their 
averages across all banks in a given sample. The models employ the Blundell-Bond (1998) two-step estimator. The Hansen tests report the orthogonal conditions of over-identifying restrictions 
of the instruments as a group under the null that over-identifying restrictions are valid, i.e. exogeneity of instruments.  AB (1) and AB (2) refer to Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests under 
the null of no autocorrelation in the first differenced error terms. Corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1% 
respectively. Bank total assets, liquidity and real GDP growth are treated as endogenous in all models. There are 34 banks in the sample of large banks defined as those banks with total assets 
ranging between U.S. $20 billion and $90 billion as of the beginning of the sample period. There are 650 observations in each model run. Models 1 and 2 employ 16 instruments, Models 3, 4, 
and 8 use 18 instruments while Models 5, 6,and 7 use 20 instruments. 
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Table 6: Dynamic panel models. Dependent variable: Bank lending growth, money-center bank sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Loan growth (1-lag) -0.474 -0.523** -0.643 -0.532 -0.727 -0.751) -0.608 -0.628 
Bank Total Assets normalized 0.044) 0.075* 0.015 0.153 -0.023 0.020 0.038 0.001 
Bank Liquidity-I  normalized 1.058 -0.167 1.992 -0.746 2.008 -0.355 0.092 1.366 
Bank Tier 1 Capital normalized -0.023 -0.004 -0.019 0.001 -0.024 -0.010 -0.011 -0.032 
Bank Deposits- I normalized 0.849  2.242  2.289  0.798 1.161 
Bank Deposits- II normalized  0.253  1.200  3.459   
Bank Deposit Costs normalized 8.473 -7.296 -5.615 -8.702 -2.496 -4.012 0.531 16.462 
Real Estate Loans normalized 0.510 0.295 0.383 0.150 0.429 0.334 0.422 0.647 
REPO-OIS Spread -0.023 -0.031      -0.003 
Federal Funds Rate -0.009** -0.009* -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.005 
Real GDP Growth Rate   -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001  
Crisis dummy     -0.091 0.036 0.039 0.057*** 
Real Estate Loans normalized*crisis     0.380    
Bank Deposits- II normalized*crisis      -1.780   
Bank Tier 1 Capital normalized*crisis      -0.003  
REPO-OIS Spread * crisis        -0.019 
Hansen Test-Chi square 1.120 1.940 2.350 6.220 2.600 6.330 2.660 1.430 
Prob>Chi-square 0.980 0.925 0.969 0.622 0.957 0.611 0.616 0.964 
AB(1) z 0.742 0.433 0.866 0.462 0.972 0.914 0.790 0.691 
AB(2) z 0.490 0.387 0.020 0.389 0.153 0.553 0.389 0.471 
Notes: Sample period 2005Q1-2010Q4. The dependent variable net loans and leases, and bank total assets enter the models in log form. The liquidity and bank deposit measures are scaled by 
bank total assets while the residential real estate loan variable is scaled by bank total loans. Liquidity I includes cash in banks and securities held to maturity and available for sale. Deposit I 
measures domestic deposits consisting of the sum of demand deposits, money market deposits, saving deposits and time deposits.  Deposit II captures demand deposits and NOW accounts 
aka transaction deposits.  The bank Tier 1 capital and the bank deposit cost variables are expressed in ratio form. All right hand side bank variables are normalized with respect to their 
averages across all banks in a given sample. The models employ the Blundell-Bond (1998) two-step estimator. The Hansen tests report the orthogonal conditions of over-identifying restrictions 
of the instruments as a group under the null that over-identifying restrictions are valid, i.e. exogeneity of instruments.  AB (1) and AB (2) refer to Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests under 
the null of no autocorrelation in the first differenced error terms. Corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to levels of significance of 10, 5, and 1% 
respectively. Bank total assets, liquidity and real GDP growth are treated as endogenous in all models. There are 14 banks in the sample of money-center banks defined as those banks with 
total assets greater than U.S. $90 billion as of the beginning of the sample period. There are 267 observations in each model run. Models 1 and 2 employ 16 instruments, Models 3, 4, and 8 use 
18 instruments while Models 5, 6, and 7 use 20 instruments. 
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The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term reported 
in Model 8 (Table 3 and Table 4) suggests that during the crisis period, as the REPO-
OIS spread rises, so does bank lending for the small and medium banks. This is an 
interesting result as our finding provides support to the theoretical model of financial 
intermediation proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (2010). They incorporate the effects 
of investor sentiment in the markets which suggests that banks have an incentive to 
securitize loans as long as the fees generated from loans are higher than potential 
losses if securitized asset prices fall. The securitization process in and of itself is 
fueled by loan production and, primarily in the case of investment banks, is 
commonly funded through REPO arrangements. 
Evidence supports H3, which states that bank’s residential real estate portfolio 
exposure has a negative effect on overall bank lending (i.e. β3 < 0 in equation 1). This 
is particularly evident in the small-bank and medium-bank sample as reported in 
Tables 3 and 4. . It is possible that larger banks are not subject to a reduction in lending 
due to benefits associated with geographical dispersion in their residential real estate 
portfolios that would not be evident in the small and medium bank samples. In the 
small-bank sample, banks with high risk exposure in their residential real estate 
portfolios increase new lending activity by a greater amount compared to banks with 
relatively lower risk exposure during the crisis period, which is contrary to 
expectations. The finding in the small-bank sample is in step with the institutional 
memory hypothesis problem proposed by Berger and Udell (2004). Under this 
hypothesis credit risk rises during expansionary periods since bankers have a short 
memory and failed to recognize prior economic slowdowns. The increased credit risk 
leads to eventual loan performance issues that further spiral into an economic 
downturn which leads banks to raise credit standards and lower credit risk 
accordingly. 
The evidence to support H4 that asserts a positive effect of transaction deposits 
on bank lending is mixed (.i.e. β2 > 0 in equation 1). The positive effect between 
transaction deposits (Deposits II variable) and bank lending is well captured in the 
small bank sample (Table 4). The evidence that transaction deposits seem to lose 
importance as bank size increases is also expected since the banks’ balance sheet 
composition, including funding sources, typically changes with bank size. An 
interesting finding that goes against the hypothesis is that banks with higher levels 
of transaction deposits reduce new lending activity by a greater amount compared to 
their counterparts with lower levels of transactions deposits during the crisis period. 
This finding is statistically significant in the medium-bank sample as shown in Model 
6 (Table 4). It is important to keep in mind that, while banks with stable financing 
sources may be better positioned from a liquidity standpoint to support lending 
activity compared to less liquid and weaker capitalized banks, other factors influence 
lending activity such as banks’ unique credit cultures, credit policy changes, evolving 
loan demand, banks’ liquidity-risk preferences, and business sentiment. However, 
these factors extend beyond our paper’s scope. 
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7. Conclusion 
The 2007- 2009 financial crisis, while unfortunate, has spawned a new wave of 
research opportunities that are of interest to academicians, economic policy makers, 
regulators, bank managers, investors, and other affected parties including 
households and businesses. The 2007-2009 financial crisis, like previous crises, was 
rooted in lax monetary policy with interest rates at historic lows and was 
accompanied by a housing market boom and bust. What is unique to this latest 
financial crisis is the banking system’s transformation to one of heavy dependence 
on securitized banking, and the ensuing Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury 
intervention in an attempt to revive the frail U.S. economy. 
We apply dynamic panel data methods to a sample of banks following a four-
size classification scheme based on asset size that yields 4,982 small banks, 475 
medium banks, 34 large banks and 14 money-center banks to assess the impact of 
securitization and the subprime mortgage collapse on bank lending over a sample 
period 2005Q1 to 2010Q4.  We conclude that securitization is a cost effective 
liquidity source for the large and money-center banks. Contrary to initial 
expectations, we find that increases in the repurchase agreement (REPO) markets 
rates had a positive impact on bank lending during the crisis period in the small and 
medium bank samples. This finding suggests that banks were able to pass on rising 
funding costs and/or generate offsetting fee income. Consistent with our 
expectations, we also find that increases in bank liquidity risk exposure, captured by 
changes in the level of banks residential real estate portfolio, curbed banks new 
lending.   
The findings in our paper have important implications. First, we find that banks 
of varying sizes do not behave in the same manner and therefore strong consideration 
should be given to re-assessing the existing pre-established guidelines that are used 
in determining a bank’s level of safety and soundness. Second, even though the 
evidence of asymmetric effects of the REPO-OIS spread on bank lending is not 
common across all bank samples, the results from the small and medium-bank 
samples provide an important signal that merits attention. The securitization process 
is a lucrative venture that fueled bank lending in the pre-crisis period and that if left 
unmonitored by regulators can result in significant negative consequences. As 
Loutskina (2011) explained, the securitization process jeopardized banks’ 
fundamental screening and monitoring roles, effectively allowing them to easily 
move assets off their balance sheets. Depending on the severity of the potential 
negative outcomes the implication of this finding extends beyond bank regulators to 
policy makers and investors. Furthermore, if we accept that bank losses have been 
adequately recognized and that banks have been appropriately recapitalized, then 
the stage has been set for business recovery. 
Our findings lead us to contemplate the following questions: will we witness a 
loosening of bank credit standards to promote bank lending to help revive the 
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economy? Have lessons been learned from the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and are bank 
regulators prepared to handle the new challenges in the post-crisis era? How will an 
eventual contraction of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet which should 
hypothetically have a negative impact on liquidity in the financial system impact 
bank lending? These questions and many others become the springboard for ongoing 
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